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What Standard Should Be Used To
Determine A Valid Juvenile Waiver?
MARTIN LEVY*
STEPHEN SKACEVIC**
INTRODUCTION
One of the more troublesome issues dealt with by the courts in
recent years has been the question of when and how a juvenile
may competently and intelligently waive such constitutionally
protected rights as the right to counsel' and the privilege against
self-incrimination. 2 It is the purpose of this comment to examine
the numerous aspects of this controversial subject and to conduct
an evaluation of the primary scholarly and jurisdictional views.
One view permits a juvenile to waive a constitutional right when
the "totality of the circumstances" indicates it is knowing and vol-
untary. A second view requires that the juvenile have an inter-
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states: "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V states: "[N]or shall anyone be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ......
ested adult present. The ultimate aim of this article is to
determine which view is to be preferred.
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF WAIVER
It has long been recognized that an individual may, under cer-
tain circumstances, waive his constitutional rights.3 Valid waiver
of a constitutional right has traditionally called for "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."4
With regard to confessions and waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, it was early determined that
the central concern should be whether the confession was volun-
tary.5 It has long been felt that involuntary confessions are both
unreliable and offensive to notions of proper police conduct.6 Tra-
ditionally, in determining voluntariness the Court has assessed
the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, including char-
acteristics of the accused and details of the interrogation.7 In
1966, the case of Miranda v. Arizona8 added significant safeguards
to this standard. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that an environment of incommunicado interrogation
"is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual
to the will of the examiner," 9 and therefore concluded that "with-
out proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently com-
pelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will
3. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4. Id. at 464.
5. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961), the Court stated that:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly estab-
lished test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years; the test of
voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and un-
constrained choice by the maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it
may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and
his capacity for self-determination is critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process.
Id. at 602.
6. The broad sweep of cases dealing with a defendant's inculpatory state-
ments project two predominant concerns: (1) that the circumstances sur-
rounding defendant's interrogation do not render his statement inherently
unreliable because involuntary; and (2) that over-zealous officers be de-
terred from the use of unconstitutional and illegal practices in obtaining a
statement from the accused.
State v. Hudson, 281 N.C. 100, 106, 187 S.E.2d 756, 760 (1972).
7. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (lack of education as a fac-
tor); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (low intelligence as a factor); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (repeated and prolonged questioning as a factor);
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (lack of advice on constitutional rights
as a factor).
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. Id. at 457.
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to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not other-
wise do so freely."10 Four warnings" were developed which are
to be given to individuals in custodial surroundings.' 2 Once these
warnings have been given, if the individual indicates, at any time
prior to or during the questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
then the interrogation must cease because he has shown a desire
to exercise his fifth amendment privilege. Any statement taken
after this privilege has been invoked is considered to be the prod-
uct of compulsion.'3 Additionally, the court indicated that "if the
individual asks for an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
the attorney is present.' 14
With regard to waiver, the Court said that "if the interrogation
continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is
taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the individual knowingly and intelligently waived his privi-
lege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or ap-
pointed counsel."15
One result of the Miranda decision is that while the Court's
concern that a waiver be voluntary is still strongly evident, the fo-
cus of inquiry has shifted to the capacity of the accused.
OVERVIEW OF JUVENILES AND THE CONSTITUTION
The early emphasis in the American juvenile justice system
was upon the rehabilitation of the youth concerned, rather than
punishment.16 To accomplish this end, the state assumed the role
of parens patriae'7 in protecting the welfare of the child. The op-
10. Id. at 467.
11. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any ques-
tioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
12. The precise meaning of the term "custodial interrogation" was not given
by the Court in this case. It has been left to state and lower federal courts to de-
velop this.
13. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
14. Id. at 474.
15. Id. at 475.
16. See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 169 [hereinafter cited as Paulsen].
17. The state became, in effect, a substitute for the natural parents because of
their unwillingness or inability to train the child properly. See Note, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HA~v. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
erations of the juvenile courts were deemed to be "civil" rather
than "criminal."18 The state, as parens patriae, felt that it had the
right to deny to the child the procedural rights available to adults.
It was asserted that a child, unlike an adult, had a right "not to
liberty but to custody. He has the right to have someone take
care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this custodial
privilege, the law must do so." 19
This position prevailed until the holding of In Re Gault,2 0 which
recognized that such "unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and proce-
dure."21 The Court asserted that this departure from established
principles and procedures frequently resulted in arbitrariness, 22
and the overall failure to observe the fundamental requirements
of due process often resulted in "inadequate or inaccurate find-
ings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy."23
In view of this fact, the Court in Gault held that when a juve-
nile court proceeding may result in a loss of liberty,24 the juvenile
in question is entitled to the right to counsel.25 Moreover, the
Court held that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is applicable to juveniles.26 The Court cautioned that if for
some reason an admission is obtained from a juvenile, the great-
est care must be taken to assure that it is made voluntarily and
not out of ignorance of one's rights.27
The issue raised at this point was whether the Miranda warn-
ings 28 were applicable to juveniles. The Court in Gault did not
specifically address this issue, although it did cite Miranda in
stating that the process by which admissions are obtained re-
quires some sort of concrete safeguards.2 9
At any rate, the vast majority of courts since Gault have held
Miranda applicable to juveniles as well as to adults, 30 and in sev-
18. See Paulsen, supra note 16, at 173.
19. See Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719,
720 (1962).
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1963).
21. Id. at 18.
22. Id. at 18-19.
23. Id. at 19-20.
24. In light of Miranda, it would logically appear that the rights guaranteed in
Gault would also extend to the pre-trial investigatory phase of juvenile proceed-
ings.
25. 387 U.S. at 41.
26. Id. at 55.
27. Id.
28. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
29. 387 U.S. at 56.
30. See, e.g., In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1968); People v. Horton, 126 Ill. App.
2d 401, 261 N.E.2d 693 (1969); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), affid,
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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eral jurisdictions the reading of Miranda warnings has been re-
quired by statute.3 1
APPROACHES TO THE QUESTION OF JUVENILE WAIVER
The Totality of CircumStances Standard
An early case which touched upon the question of juvenile
waiver was Haley v. Ohio.32 In Haley, a fifteen-year-old boy was
arrested shortly after midnight on a robbery-murder charge. He
was subjected to interrogation by relays of police officers and was
not advised of his right to counsel. At 5:00 A.M. he made an oral
confession. He was then advised of his right to remain silent, and
of the fact that his statement might be used against him. Subse-
quently, he signed a written confession and was held for three
days incommunicado before being arraigned.33
The Court in Haley recognized that the age of the accused was
a crucial element in the determination of whether the confession
was voluntary. The Court said,
[Wlhen, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us,
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender
and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more
exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is
a period of great instability which the crisis of adolesence produces. A 15-
year-old lad, questioned through the dead of night by relays of police is a
ready victim of the inquisition.3 4
In arriving at its holding in this case, the Court, although recog-
nizing the importance of the accused's age and immaturity to the
determination of a valid waiver, declined to hold as a matter of
law that these factors were in themselves determinative. Rather,
the case was decided pursuant to the "totality of circumstances"
standard, in which such factors as the accused's age, "the hours
when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he
had no friend or counsel to advise him, and the callous attitude of
the police toward his rights" were taken into consideration. Ex-
amination of these factors combined to result in a determination
that the confession was obtained by methods offensive to due
31. See, e.g., CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 625 (West Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1109 (West Supp. 1978).
32. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
33. Id. at 598-99.
34. Id. at 599.
process. 35
In Gallegos v. Colorado,36 a similar approach is evident. In that
case, an oral confession was obtained from a fourteen-year-old
boy immediately following his arrest in connection with an as-
sault and robbery. Thereafter he was held incommunicado for
five days, and, although he was not interrogated, he ultimately
signed a formal confession which was used against him in a sub-
sequent murder prosecution after the victim had died.37 Applying
Haley to the facts of the case, the Court in Gallegos held that the
formal confession had been obtained through violation of the
youth's due process rights.38
As in Haley, the Court in Gallegos recognized that the factors
of youth and immaturity played an important part in the determi-
nation of whether or not a valid waiver had been made. The
Court said that "he cannot be compared with an adult in full pos-
session of his senses and knowledgable of the consequences of
his admissions."39 Once again, however, the Court declined to
rule that age and immaturity alone were conclusive. It was held
that the determination of cases such as this could be made only
after an evaluation of the "totality of circumstances."' 4 In Galle-
gos, the factors considered were the age of the accused, the
length of detention, the failure to send for the minor's parents,
"the failure to immediately bring him before the judge of the Ju-
venile Court, and the failure to see that he had access to the ad-
vice of an attorney or friend."41
The "totality of circumstances" standard, as delineated in the
Haley and Gallegos decisions, would appear to be the approach
utilized in several jurisdictions to determine the validity of a juve-
nile's waiver of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. 42 This stan-
dard was well stated in People v. Lara,43 where the court said:
[T] his, then, is the general rule: a minor has the capacity to make a vol-
untary confession, even of capital offenses, without the presence or con-
35. Id. at 600-01.
36. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
37. Id. at 50.
38. Id. at 55.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Id. at 55.
41. Id.
42. Among the states which follow the "totality of circumstances" standard,
see, e.g.: California-People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1967); Connecticut--State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 A.2d 867 (1970); illi-
nois-People v. Pierre, 114 Ill. App. 2d 283, 252 N.E.2d 706 (1969); Kansas-State v.
Hinkle, 206 Kan. 472, 479 P.2d 841 (1971); Minnesota-State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430,
212 N.W.2d 664 (1973); Nebraska--State v. Lytle, 194 Neb. 353, 231 N.W.2d 681
(1975); New Mexico-State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7, 419 P.2d 219 (1966); Wiscon-
sin-Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974).
43. 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
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sent of counsel, or other responsible adult, and the admissability of such a
confession depends not on his age alone, but on a combination of that fac-
tor with such other circumstances as his intelligence, education, experi-
ence, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his
statement.4 4
The "totality of circumstances" standard can be viewed as an
integration of two components. The first component is the asser-
tion that a juvenile, by himself, may waive his rights.45 The sec-
ond element is the use of a wide variety of factors, including age
and immaturity, to determine the validity of such a waiver.46
The issue which invariably arises when this standard is used is
whether it provides sufficient protection for the juvenile against
the dangers occasioned by his own youth.
The "Presence of Parents" Standard
Although, thus far, no case has held that the law extends to
juveniles a blanket presumption of incapacity to waive constitu-
tional rights,47 a number of jurisdictions have taken the view that
the protection afforded juveniles by the "totality of circum-
stances" standard is insufficient, given the natural inequality
present in the custodial interrogation process. 48
44. Id., at 383, 432 P.2d at 215, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
45. The lower courts have uniformly held that the condition of infancy alone is
not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise competent waiver of constitutional rights.
See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 476 F,2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1973); White v. State, 13
Md. App. 1, 280 A.2d 283 (1971); Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224, 279 N.E.2d
706 (1972).
46. An excellent example of the variety of factors used in such an evaluation
is found in West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968):
(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the
accused as to both the substance of the charge, if any has been filed, and
the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4)
whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with
relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated
before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interro-
gation; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused re-
fused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether
the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date.
Id. at 469.
47. A possible exception may be in New Jersey, where, in State in Interest of
S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181 (1972), the court stated: "[R]ecitation of the Miranda
warnings to a boy of 10 even when they are explained is undoubtedly meaningless.
Such a boy certainly lacks the capability to fully understand the meaning of his
rights. Thus, he cannot make a knowing and intelligent waiver of something he
cannot understand." Id. at 115, 293 A.2d at 184-85.
48. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
One such case was Lewis v. State,49 which involved an oral con-
fession by a seventeen-year-old youth in regard to a murder. Al-
though the youth had been informed of his rights per Miranda,
neither a parent nor counsel was present at the time of the admis-
sion.5 0 In considering the validity of the accused's waiver, the
court took exception to the imprecision of the "totality of circum-
stances" standard when it said:
[TIhe authorities seeking to question a juvenile enter into an area of
doubt and confusion when the child appears to waive his rights to counsel
and against self-incrimination .... There are no concrete guidelines for
the authorities to follow in order to insure that the waiver will be upheld
.... It is harmful to the system of criminal justice to require law enforce-
ment authorities to second guess the courts in the area of constitutional
rights. Clearly defined procedures should be established in areas which
lend themselves to such standards. Age is one area which lends itself to
clearly defined standards.
5 1
The court observed that although for many years the high
courts of the United States had recognized the necessity of a dif-
ferent approach to juvenile waiver, none of them had specified
precisely which method should be employed.5 2 The court held
that while a juvenile is entitled to waive his rights to the same ex-
tent as an adult, certain safeguards recognizing the inherent dif-
ferences between adults and minors are required "to insure that
any waiver is truly voluntary." 53 The safeguards established in
Lewis were that a juvenile's statement was inadmissable against
him in a subsequent trial or hearing unless the child was given an
opportunity to consult with his parents, guardian, or an attorney
as to whether or not to waive those rights.54
A similar view is reflected in State in Interest of Dino,55 a mur-
der case in which the court held invalid a confession by a thir-
teen-year-old boy. Although he had been informed of his rights
per Miranda, the court ruled that the waiver was not the product
of a knowing and intelligent choice due to the absence of a parent
or interested adult at the time that it was made.56 The court rea-
soned that "because most juveniles are not mature enough to un-
derstand their rights and are not competent to exercise them, the
concepts of fundamental fairness embodied in the Declaration of
Rights of our [Louisiana] Constitution require that juveniles not
be permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own." 57
49. 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
50. Id. at 433, 288 N.E.2d at 139-40.
51. Id. at 436-37, 288 N.E.2d at 141.
52. Id. at 438, 288 N.E.2d at 142.
53. Id. at 439.
54. Id.
55. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
56. Id. at 594.
57. Id.
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The court in Dino established that the state must satisfy three
prerequisites if it is to sustain its burden of proving a valid
waiver: (1) "that the juvenile in question actually consulted with
an attorney or adult before waiver," (2) "that the attorney or
adult consulted was interested in the welfare of the juvenile," and
(3) "that if an adult other than an attorney was consulted, the
adult was fully advised of the rights of the juvenile."58 In compar-
ison to Lewis, it can be seen that the standard in Dino features
the additional component of requiring either a parent or an inter-
ested adult to be present prior to waiver.
A series of decisions in Pennsylvania59 had established a rule60
similar to that in Dino. This rule provided the background for
Commonwealth v. Smith,61 a murder case which elaborated to
some extent on the sort of expansion seen in Dino. The case in-
volved a confession by a seventeen-year-old accused which was
made after there had been an opportunity for him to consult with
his father. Even though an opportunity to consult had been af-
forded, the confession was deemed inadmissable because the
court determined that the father was not an informed adult 62 or
interested in the welfare of his son.63
The court reasoned that if the adult consulted is not one who is
concerned with the interest and welfare of the individual, "the
protection sought to be afforded is illusory and the procedure fails
to accomplish its purpose of offsetting the disadvantages occa-
sioned by the immaturity."64 The court also noted that if the in-
terested adult to be consulted is as ignorant of the accused's
constitutional rights as the accused himself, then the protective
58. Id.
59. Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974); Commonwealth
v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975); Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa.
90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975); Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 350 A.2d 829 (1975).
60. The rule established was that before any waiver of Miranda rights, a juve-
nile must be afforded an opportunity to consult with a mature and informed indi-
vidual, concerned primarily with his welfare prior thereto.
61. 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977).
62. The court reasoned that:
Where an informed adult is present the inequality of the position of the
accused and police is to some extent neutralized and due process satis-
fied. However, where the adult is ignorant of the constitutional rights that
surround a suspect in a criminal case and exerts his or her influence upon
the minor in reaching the decision, it is clear that due process is offended.
Id. at 501, 372 A.2d at 801.
63. Id. at 500.
64. Id.
procedure is meaningless. 65
The decisions in Lewis, Dino, and Smith are indicative of a gen-
eral trend away from the "totality of circumstances" standard.
This approach has been adopted by at least two other jurisdic-
tions,66 and is favored by several commentators.67
Simplified Language
Because a major part of the problem of juvenile waiver centers
on the minor's inability to comprehend the nature of his constitu-
tional rights, a suggestion is sometimes made that the information
be conveyed in terms that the juvenile can understand. 68
In 1969, an empirical study was conducted by two California at-
torneys for the purpose of answering two questions: (1) should
the Miranda warnings be revised for the juvenile offender and,
(2) does a minor have the capacity to knowingly and intelligently
waive his Miranda rights?69 Interviews were conducted with
ninety juveniles to calculate their understanding of a simplified
warning70 and a formal warning. 71 The results were tabulated in
terms of a percentage figure of understanding. The overall results
were not striking, and little difference in understanding was noted
65. Id.
66. In Missouri, a confession by a juvenile is inadmissible unless both he and
either a parent, guardian, or adult friend were informed of his rights to remain si-
lent and to an attorney. The juvenile must also be given an opportunity to consult
with either his parents, guardian, adult friend, or attorney as to whether he wishes
to waive those rights. See In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1973).
In Georgia, the state is required to advise the parents of the accused juvenile of
his right to counsel prior to any waiver. See Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325,
167 S.E.2d 163 (1969).
67. See, e.g., Comment, Interrogation of Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's
Presence, 77 DICK. L. REV. 543 (1972-73); Comment, Recent Develop-
ments-Criminal Law, 1972 UNiv. OF ILL. L. FORUM 625.
68. See, e.g., In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
The court in this case said: "To avoid future conflicts on this issue, we recommend
that juvenile officers and police be prepared to give their compulsory Miranda
warnings in terms that reflect the language and experience of today's juveniles."
Id. at 464 n.13, 450 P.2d at 308 n.13, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 13 n.13.
69. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Ferguson & Douglas].
70. You don't have to talk to me at all, now or later on, it is up to you.
If you decide to talk to me, I can go to court and repeat what you say
against you.
If you want a lawyer, an attorney, to help you to decide what to do, you
can have one free before and during questioning by me now or by anyone
else later on.
Do you want me to explain or repeat anything about what I have just
told you?
Remembering what I've just told you, do you want to talk to me?"
Id. at 40.
71. The standard San Diego City Police Department Miranda warning was
used.
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between those who were read the formal rights and those who
were read the simplified rights.72 However, when the results at-
tributable to delinquent youths were deleted, a sample was ob-
tained that prompted the authors of the study to conclude that a
non-deliquent juvenile 73 responds more positively to a simplified
warning.74
The results of the above study and others75 indicate that the
use of simplified terminology in explaining constitutional rights to
a juvenile may be a valuable tool in solving the problem of juve-
nile waiver. Its use as a total solution is doubtful, however, since
the problem of juvenile waiver cannot be solved solely by elimi-
nating the comprehension aspect.
72. The overall percentage of understanding Was computed with regard to five
elements: (1) the right to silence, (2) the possibility that the court might use
statements made by the juvenile later at court, (3) the right to an attorney, (4) the
right to an attorney during questioning, and (5) the fact that an attorney can be
appointed at no cost. Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 69, at 43. The overall results
are as follows:
Miranda Simplified
Right to Silence .90 .89
Court's Use of Statements .67 .70
Right to an Attorney .89 .84
Right to an Attorney during Questioning .27 .34
Right to an Attorney without Cost .61 .39
Id. at 48.
73. The delinquent youths were deleted to obtain a pure sample, uninfluenced
by prior exposure to warnings from police, probation, and judicial officers. Id. at
49.
74. This portion of the study was confined to fourteen-year-olds, who com-
prised 44 of the 90 individuals interviewed. Id. Concentration on this age group
was the result of the fact that under California law, age 14 is the age at which a
juvenile is felt to be competent to commit crime. Id. at 41; see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 26 (West 1955). The results were as follows:
Miranda Simplified
Right to Silence .74 .84
Court's Use of Statements .47 .53
Right to an Attorney .69 .81
Right to an Attorney during Questioning .19 .34
Right to an Attorney without Cost .47 .44
Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 69, at 50.
75. In a survey conducted by members of the Juvenile Justice Committee of
the Los Angeles County Grand Jury of a random selection of school children visit-
ing the Criminal Courts Building, it was found that 61% of the subjects indicated a
better understanding of a proposed set of "Juvenile Miranda Rights." 1977-78 L.A.
County Grand Jury Final Report 110, 111.
The problem of juvenile waiver is two-fold. One difficulty is the
inability of the juvenile generally to comprehend his rights. An-
other problem is that an extra element of coercion may be pres-
ent when a juvenile is subjected to prejudicial interrogation.
Ideally, the standard used to determine a valid juvenile waiver
will be one which solves both aspects of the problem.
EVALUATION
As has been seen, the issue raised in a consideration of juvenile
waiver has not been whether a minor may waive his constitu-
tional rights, but rather when and how he may do so. The resolu-
tion of this general issue depends upon the resolution of two sub-
issues: (1) what can be done to resolve the problem of a juve-
nile's comprehension of his constitutional rights, and (2) what can
be done to alleviate the extra element of coercion which results
from the minor's lack of experience and immaturity? The pre-
ferred approach to juvenile waiver is the one which best provides
solutions to both issues.
The Comprehension Issue
In United States v. Frazier,76 a dissenting justice, discussing the
importance of the Miranda warnings to inform one of his consti-
tutional rights, acknowledged that "the purpose of the Miranda
warnings is to convey information to the suspect. Plainly, one
who is told something he does not understand is no better off
than one who is told nothing at all."77 This statement clearly de-
scribes a major problem inherent in a determination of whether a
waiver was knowing and intelligent, even in an instance where
Miranda warnings have been given.
The Court in Haley78 said, "we cannot give any weight to recit-
als which merely formalize constitutional requirements. Formu-
las of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the
facts of life which contradict them."79 Apparently, one such fact
of life may be the natural difficulty a juvenile experiences in com-
prehending the abstract notion of his legal rights.
In the 1969 empirical study discussed above,8 0 one of the ques-
tions raised was whether a minor has the capacity to knowingly
and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. The results8 1 showed
76. 476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
77. Id. at 900 (dissenting opinion).
78. Haley v. Ohio, 322 U.S. 596 (1948).
79. Id. at 601.
80. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
81. See note 74 supra.
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that, when read the Miranda warning, the average non-delin-
quent fourteen-year-old showed a disturbing overall lack of com-
prehension of his rights. This was especially evident with regard
to the following: (1) the possibility that a statement may be used
against them in court, (2) the fact that they may have an attorney
during the interrogations, and (3) the fact that they may obtain
the services of an attorney at no charge if they are unable to af-
ford one.82 The conclusion drawn by the authors of the study was
that only a small percentage of juveniles is capable of knowingly
and intelligently waiving Miranda rights.83 It was also concluded
that if intelligent relinquishment of a known right were the sole
standard to be used to determine the validity of a waiver, then
eighty-six of the ninety juveniles interviewed (96%) would have
given statements that could have been inadmissible at law.84
Clearly, comprehension of constitutional rights is a problem.
Thus, the question is, which of the approaches thus far examined
best addresses this problem?
At first glance it would appear that both the "totality of circum-
stances" standard and the "presence of a parent or interested
adult" standard are equally well-equipped (or equally well-un-
equipped) to handle this aspect of the overall problem of juvenile
waiver. The solution to the problem of increasing a juvenile's
comprehension of his rights seems to lie in the area of making a
greater and more conscientious effort to explain the relevant
rights, using whatever tools are available to aid in this explana-
tion. The use of simplified language and "Juvenile Miranda
Warnings" may be such tools.85
It can be argued that the presence of an interested adult is
more conducive to effective comprehension of constitutional
rights by a juvenile. In Commonwealth v. Smith,86 the court ob-
served that:
[T]he administering of Miranda warnings to a juvenile, without providing
an opportunity to that juvenile to consult with a mature, informed individ-
ual concerned primarily with the interest of the juvenile, was inadequate
to offset the disadvantage occasioned by his youth. The new rule appreci-
ates that the inexperience of the minor affects not only his or her ability
82. Id.
83. Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 69, at 54.
84. Id.
85. The authors in the Ferguson and Douglas study admitted, however, that
use of the simplified Miranda rights form failed to increase understanding signifi-
cantly. Id.
86. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
to understand the full implication and consequences of the predicament
but also renders the judgment inadequate to assess the spectrum of con-
siderations encompassed in the waiver decision.
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Similarly, the court in In Re K. W.B.88 recognized that "[t] he pres-
ence of a juvenile's parent at police questioning will provide the
advice and protection that the juvenile officer cannot, consistently
with his other duties, provide."89
This argument certainly does have merit and, thus, it appears
that where the problem of a minor's comprehension of his rights
is concerned, the "presence of a parent or interested adult" stan-
dard is superior.
The Coercion Aspect-Voluntariness
It has long been recognized in the area of juvenile waiver of
constitutionally protected rights that special care must be taken
to ensure that it was voluntary.9 0 This fact was reiterated in In Re
Gault,9 1 where the Court cautioned that "the greatest care must
be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense
not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was
not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy,
fright, or despair."92
The issue that arises at this point is, what can be done to safe-
guard against such a waiver? The Court in Haley v. Ohio93 stated
that "[h]e [the juvenile] needs counsel and support if he is not to
become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone
on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he
knows it, crush him."94
In evaluating the level of protection afforded an accused juve-
nile against involuntary waiver, the "totality of circumstances"
standard appears clearly inferior to the "presence of a parent or
interested adult" standard. This is so because it provides no safe-
guards other than an indefinite case-by-case determination which
"tends to mire the courts in a morass of speculation similar to
that from which Miranda was designed to extricate them."95
On the other hand, the "presence of a parent or interested
adult" standard provides protection which has support both in
case law and in common sense. Perhaps the court in In Re
87. Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. at 492, 372 A.2d at 800.
88. 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1973).
89. Id. at 282.
90. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
91. 387 U.S. 1.
92. Id. at 55.
93. 332 U.S. 596.
94. Id. at 600.
95. In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 591 (La. 1978) (footnote omitted).
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Dino,96 paraphrasing a passage from Miranda,97 summed it up
best when it stated:
the rights which a juvenile may waive before interrogation are so funda-
mental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of requiring
the advice of a parent, counsel or advisor so relatively simple and well es-
tablished as a safeguard against a juvenile's improvident judicial acts, that
we should not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the juvenile
could, on his own, understand and effectively exercise his rights. Assess-
ments of how the "totality of circumstances" affected a juvenile in a par-
ticular case can never be more than speculation.9 8
CONCLUSION
It seems clear the the preferred approach to be used in deter-
mining the validity of a juvenile waiver is to require the presence
of a parent or interested adult prior to waiver. This standard pro-
vides substantial protection for the accused juvenile whereas the
"totality of circumstances" standard does not. The time and ex-
pense spared the courts and the litigants by the use of a concrete
standard adds additional weight to this viewpoint.
It may be argued that the use of this standard will overly inter-
fere with the investigative activities of the law enforcement au-
thorities, but "[iif the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system."99
96. Id.
97. The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to
the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in
individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a
warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant pos-
sessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior
contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is
a clearcut fact.
384 U.S. at 468-69.
98. In re Dino, 359 So. 2d at 592.
99. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).

